Bishop Ulrich himself directed the defence of the town during the Magyar siege of 955· I 0 It was, however, the achievement of Otto the to commit the bishops to the military purposes of the new German imperium on a regular basis. I I But if the bishops supported the Empire in arms, the imperial Church did not lose sight of the parallel tradition of missionary en deavour which had achieved great political significance under St Boniface, his circle, and successors. I 2 Louis the Pious had relied upon this method when he engaged St Ansgar upon the abortive conversion of Scandinavia in the ninth century ,I 3 and it was employed by Otto III in his diplomatic dealings with Poland and Hungary at the end of the tenth. I 4 The last major instance was the work of Bishop Otto of in the conversion of Pomerania in the twelfth century. I 5
As missionaries, reformers, and administrators, the bishops of the imperial Church were unrivalled in Europe. I 6 Instrumental in guiding the papal curia 11 L. Auer, 'Der Kriegsdienst des Klerus unter den siichsischen Kaisern', Mt"tte£/rmgen des lnstitutsfor dsterreichische Geschichtsforschung, 79 (1971), 316-407 and 8o (1972) , 48--7 0; E. N. Johnson, The Secular Activities of the German Episcopate 919-1024 (University of Nebraska Studies, 3o-1; Lincoln, 1932); Zielinski, Reichsept'skopat, i. zzo--42; 0. KOhler, 'Die ottonische Reichskirche: Ein Forschungsbericht' in A del und Kirche, 141-204; T. Reuter, 'The "Imperial Church System" of 1he Ottonian and Salian Rulers: a Reconsideration', Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 33 (1982) , 347--?4-12 T. Schieffer, Winfrid-Bonifatius und die christliche Grundlegung Europas, new edn. (Darmstadt, 1980) , 12o-286; W. Levison, Engla nd and the Continent in the Eighth Century (Oxford, 1946) , 7fr-93; T. Reuter, 'Saint Boniface and Eutope', in The Greatest Englishman: Essays on Saint Boniface (Exeter, 198o) , 69--<)4; Wallace-Hadrill, Fra nkish Church, 143-61. 0 G. Waitz, Vita e Anskarii et Rimherti (NIGH, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum ss; Hanover, 1884); H. Jahnkuhn, 'Das Missionsfeld Ansgars', Friihmittelalterliche Studien, I (1967), 212-21; Wallace-Hadrill, Frankish Church,-414-16. 14 From the extensive literature see P. E. Schramm, Kaiser, Rom und Renovatio: Studien zur Geschichte des rb. mischen Erneuerungsgeda nkens vorrZ: Ende des karolingischen Reiches bis zum lnvestiturstreit, Jrd edn. (Darmstadt, 1975) , 87-187; R. Wenskus, Studien zur historisch-politischen Gedankenwelt Bruns von Querfu rt (Mitteldeutsche Forschungen, s; Munster /Cologne, i956); A. F. Czajkowski, 'The Congress of Gniezno in the Year rooo', Speculum, 24 (1949) , 339-56; and both traditions, force and persuasion, discussed in the collection edited by H. Beumann, Heideninission und Kreuzzugsgedanke in der deutschen Ostpolitik des Mit telalters, znd edn. (Wege der Forschung,-7; Darmstadt, 1973). into the path of reform in the mid-eleventh century, 17 the German episcopate discovered that, papal schisms notwithstanding, the demands of ecclesiastical reform and of political loyalty to the Empire were by no means incompat ible. 18 The military habits and methods ingrained in the tenth and eleventh centuries also died hard. The German bishops may have been remarkably talented in the peacetime execution of their office, but their martial spirit re mained so inseparable a part of the episcopal apparatus that it came in fo r considerable comment. For I 167 the Cologne Chronicle, referring to Freder ick Barbarossa's fo urth Italian expedition, records with pride how Arch bishop Rainald of Cologne had assisted the emperor in the subjection of Italy. 1 9 Accompanied only by 140 knights, the archbishop was caught up and besieged in Tusculum by a large fo rce of Romans. When Archbishop Chris tian of Mainz and the chancellor Philip of Heins berg, dean of Cologne, sud denly appeared with soo reinforcements, Archbishop Rainald burst out of the town with his small troop and inflicted a terrible massacre upon the distracted besiegers. As a result of this victory, Barbarossa was enabled to enter Rome. Then epidemic decimated his army, destroyed the archbishop, 'a man re markable for wisdom and diligence, upon whom the emperor's glory relied to the utmost degree', and obliged the ruler to return to Germany. In a similar vein the Stade Annals report that on the next expedition, the above-mentioned Archbishop Christian of Mainz depopulated Lombardy and Tuscany with his mercenaries and struck great fear throughout Italy by besieging and reducing Bologna, Ferrara, Ravenna, and Ancona. 2 0 In the battle fo r Bologna it was recorded that, clad in fu ll armour and on horseback, the bloodthirsty prelate killed nine men with a triple-headed bludgeon. One of his secretaries, Henry of Bremen, saw him take a rock and smash the teeth of twenty-eight prominent Italians, presumably prisoners. Not all bishops turned out to be equal to the military tasks which circumstances imposed upon them. The sources for the Saxon War (1 073--'75) and the subsequent (Wiener Dissertationen aus dem Gebiete der Geschichte, 10; Vienna, 1968) The author of our principal account of this, Bruno of Merseburg, com mented sarcastically upon the dilemmas of bishops when secular politics com pelled them to go to war. 'Since they were trained fo r the religious life, all of them knew better how to sing psalms than to dispose of legions in war; and turning in flight at the very sight of a battle, so many fo llowed them that the king must have decided that almost the entire Saxon army had given way and fled.'22 Bruno was canonically correct but politically old-fashioned in claiming that the bishops 'should never even have come to a fight', for their vassal-status as prelates invested by the crown and enfeoffed with temporali ties implied the regular provision of military service. Even when investiture was abandoned in I I 22,2 3 the retention of temporalities by the episcopate still carried military obligations. As Abbot Wibald of Carvey, an impeccably reformist dignitary, wrote to Bishop Bernhard of Hildesheim in II49/4 the king's service, servitium regis, required attendance at court, the provision of hospitality and supply to the itinerant royal household, and assistance upon the king's campaigns, in expeditione. 2 5 And one of this bishop's predecessors at Hildesheim had joined just such an expedition in I I 26, Lothar III's cam paign against the Czechs. In the ambushes which brought disaster upon the Germans in the defiles of the Erzgebirge, 'the bishop of Hildesheim is said to have lost the fifty knights which he led on that expedition. ' (Ertriige der Forschung, 89; Darmstadt, 1978) and 'Quellenstudien zum Servitium Regis (90D--1250)', Archiv for Diplomatik, 22 (1976), 187--27 1; 24 (1978), 203-9 1; 31 (1985) Otto of Freising managed to lose his division of the German army in a Saljuq ambush, but with the bishop of Naumburg, he escaped to the southern coast of Asia Minor. In his own account of the expedition he maintained great dis cretion about this inglorious episode, 27 mentioning only that 'scattered by the Turks while proceeding to Jerusalem', the party was able to continue the journey by sea.
In pursuit of their interests as lords of their temporalities in Germany, the bishops were involved in scores oflocal conflicts which might similarly end in disaster. For a long time the bishops of Utrecht experienced resistance to their rule in their extensive territories beyond the River IJssel, culminating in the dangerous rising of 1227. Bishop Otto II conducted his own forces to the siege of Coevorden, but they were caught in the swamps by a counter-attack of the Frisian knights and peasants, and the bishop was killed in the rout. It was several years before order was restored in this region. 2 8 In another case, the city of Strasburg rose in defence of its rights against the new bishop, Walter of Hohengeroldseck, in 1261. During the subsequent campaign against the townsmen, the bishop was defeated at the Battle of Hausbergen. Directing in person, he had two horses killed under him, and reluctantly fl ed upon a third. More than sixty of his knights, including his brother and uncle, were killed, and many more were captured. Within the year he had died of chagrin, according to the report. 2 9 In a struggle on a much larger scale, the dispute which had originated in the I rsos over ducal authority between the archbishops of Cologne and the dukes of Brabant in the lower Rhineland was resolved fo rever at the Battle of Worringen in 1288. A small but efficient Brabantine coalition destroyed Archbishop Siegfr ied's army, captured and imprisoned him for a year, and extorted a large ransom as well as his recogni tion of all their territorial rights. 3 0
No doubt these prelates were guilty of serious military misjudgements, but one of Archbishop Siegfr ied's more fo rmidable predecessors at Cologne, Conrad of Hochstaden (1238--61) outfaced his princely rivals in the archdiocese. 32 One of his schemes was to introduce Earl Richard of Cornwall into Germany as king of the Romans in I257.33 The new king wrote home to his nephew, the Lord Edward, about the military campaigns in the Rhineland which his arrival had provoked, and remarked with some enthusiasm: 'Look what spirited and warlike archbishops and bishops we have in Germany; I would count it not at all unprofitable to you if such were created in England, by whose attention you would be secured against the importunate assaults of rebellion.'34 If this spirited and warlike tendency was a consequence of necessity rather than of sacerdotal corrup tion, 3 5 a strong intellectual tradition continued to question episcopal involve ment with imperial politics. In the twelfth century Provost Gerhoch of Reichersberg maintained that the German bishops had been tainted by their temporalities, 3 6 and in the fo urteenth Conrad of Megenberg held that they had proved untrustworthy in the quarrels between Louis the Bavarian and the papacy. 37 By the time that the anonymous Reformatio Sigismundi was completed in the I440s, the author had nothing but distaste for the belligerence of the Ger man episcopate: It is hard to resist the irony of Erasmus on the same subject:
I still find it difficult to make up my mind whether certain German bishops have set an example or are fo llowing one, in the way in which they have abandoned pomp and benedictions and other such ceremonial matters and carry on as secular lords, even to the extent of believing that it is almost a mark of cowardice and unbecoming to a bishop to render up his warrior soul to God elsewhere than on the battlefi eld. 39 Although the bellicose secular procedures of the German episcopate were a matter for such extensive and long-lasting comment, good reasons fo r them can be inferred fr om the political tradition of the medieval Empire. The rank of king and emperor itself included the effective headship of the Church as a visible hierarchy. In 1047 Abbot Eckbert of Tegernsee described Henry III as caput ecclesie, and when Archbishop Aribo of Mainz addressed Conrad II about taking up the christianum imperium in 1024, Wipo ascribed to him the words: 'You have arrived at the highest office, you are the vicar of Christ.'40 As servants of God, bishops were also required to sustain the terrestrial pur poses of rulers who were themselves anointed like Christ, rex et sacerdos. 41 Belief in kingship sanctified by Christ's image as heavenly king may have been questioned by the papal reform movement, but it was amply revived in the twelfth century, and not only in the German Empire. Bishop Otto ofFreising reports that during Frederick Barbarossa's coronation at Aachen in II 52, the new bishop of Munster was also consecrated, so that 'in one church the same day saw the unction of two persons who are sacramentally anointed according to the custom of the New and Old Testaments, and are rightly called christi Domini, the Lord's anointed. '42 The German cathedral churches possessed land on a vast scale, 43 and this alone compelled bishops, however unworldly in character or vocation, to act in the aggressive style of lay magnates. estates, the supervision and delegation of effective jurisdiction over their dependants, and the defence of their territories through castle-building and enfeoffing armed retinues demanded their continual attention. German bishops were not, of course, alone amongst the prelates of the Latin Church in being generously endowed with temporal possessions in need of management. But the relative remoteness of the royal court, in its perambulations around a vast Empire, tended to fo cus reliance upon the defensive practices of immun ity and advocacy in the dioceses. In regional politics the church-lands were theoretically secured fr om all outside interference by royal privileges of immunity, 44 as well as enjoying the protection of secular advocates appointed fr om the neighbouring aristocracy. In practice these institutions did not work well, and bishops in their dioceses were obliged to defend themselves by fo rce fr om their local rivals, all too often their own unscrupulous advocates. 45 To conserve what their sees possessed in lands, jurisdictions, and economic rights, the bishops therefore had little choice but to compete on military terms with the other princes and lords in their region. Thus Bishop Otto I of Bam berg, reformer, missionary, and founder of monasteries, was also praised by one of his biographers fo r the care with which he preserved the rights of his vassals and ministeriales, and constructed new castles throughout his lands. 46
German civil confl icts, royal campaigns abroad, and self�help within the diocese thus imposed a tough military tradition upon the German episcopate. Important detail emerges fr om the tenth century about how bishops equipped themselves with the necessary retinues, fo rtifi cations, and supportive strat egies. The mounted miles or knight with heavy armour, weapons, and war horses continued to be the most effective type of military retainer in the Carolingian successor-kingdoms. 47 Increasingly these vassal milites were maintained by heritable grants of land in fi ef, the practice of precarial tenure derived fr om the Carolingian past and much extended between the tenth and twelfth centuries. We are told that towards the end of the tenth century, Bishop Notker of Liege (972-roo8) divided the lands of his church into three equal portions, the fi rst to sustain the episcopal household, the second to sup- port the chapter and the monastic fo undations, and the third to grant out in fief to his vassals or milicia. 48 This radical solution was also adopted by his contemporary, Bishop Henry of Wiirzburg (995/6-ror8), who took over much land fr om Amorbach Abbey at the end of the tenth century, 'and gave it in fief to his milites '. 49 The bishops of Eichstatt, in whom we shall be inter ested later, first began to enfeoff vassals in their relatively under-developed diocese late in the ninth century, when Emperor Arnulf endowed the see with Herrieden Abbey and most of its extensive estates. 5° From an account deriv ing in its final fo rm fr om the eleventh century, we hear that Bishop Erchan bald (c.88z-<JI2) threw out the monks and installed canons on meagre prebends, distributing the rest of Herrieden's resources to his militia or vas sals. 51 'For the first time the bishopric ofEichstatt began to have milites, since before that it had had none or very fe w. And today, of all the number ofEich statt's vassals, three or fo ur excepted, all are benefi ced fr om the lands of this abbey.' This arrangement enabled the bishops to contribute to the expansive imperialism of the Ottonians, as when Bishop Reginald was summoned to Italy with fi fty armed warriors by Otto II in 98 r. 52
If bishops were enfeoffing knights on a larger scale in the tenth and ele venth centuries, the sources pose problems about who these vassals actually were. For Bishop Thietmar of Merseburg (roo9-r8) the word miles had several uses. It was a personal, aristocratic epithet; Duke Conrad the Red, killed at the Lech in 955, is egregius miles and Burgrave Ricdag of Meissen, assassinated in 984, is inclitus miles. 53 It was also employed fo r vassals in general; Duke Hermann ofSwabia's milites in roar, for example, or the milites sancti Martini, the vassals of the archbishop of Mainz, in 984.54 Obviously the bishop's own aristocratic great-grandfathers, milites optimi et genere claris simi, 'fi nest knights of the most exalted birth', who died in action against the Slavs in 929, would have had nothing in common with the bishop of Halber stadt's fo llowing of vassals called milites servi, or with the abbot of Carvey's 'vassals of inferior condition '. 55 In the see of Salzburg, where we are relat ively well informed about the archiepiscopal retinues, 56 the biographies of Archbishop Gebhard I (106o-88) inform us that his .fideles were noblemen and ministeriales, and that he was supported by his milites, including Count Engelbert of Orten burg, and by his military servitores. 57
Eleventh-century sources thus begin to refer to retinues of ministeriales, knights of unfree status, and their importance to bishops was perhaps adum brated in the Lex fa milie or rules which Bishop Burchard of Worms (1ooo-zs) drew up shortly before his death, for the town of Worms and all the depen dants of the cathedral church. 58 Much more explicit information about the new vassal-militias of ministeriales was provided by Bishop Gunther of Bam berg (1057-65) in one of his charters.59 The Bamberg ministeriales were endowed with hereditary fi efs in return for military and administrative ser vices. If the bishop preferred not to grant a fief, then the ministerialis was fr ee to seek service and rewards under another lord; militet cui vult. Bamberg ministeriales paid their own preparatory costs fo r military campaigns north of the Alps, and then received subsidy fr om the bishop while actually in the field. For Italian expeditions the bishop provided extra horses and a cash-ad vance of £3 fo r fi tting out the warriors. In the bishop's court, ministeriales enjoyed the right of compurgation for all offences save conspiracy against their lord. In his household administration they were obliged only to exercise the honourable offices, of seneschal, butler, chamberlain, marshal, and fo res ter. Such rules of status and service have obscure antecedents which go back 55 Ibid., 14; MGH Diplomata, Otto III 104 (992) and Arno!f 3 (887). See also Annates Sangallenses maiores (MGH, Scriptores, 83 (1035) to the ninth century, 60 and they explain why it was possible to retain men who were vassals in law, knights in fu nction, and unfree in status. 61 It has been convincingly suggested that some of the two thousand or so loricati, armoured warriors, summoned by Otto II to Italy for the calamitous Cala brian campaign of 982, were embryonic ministeriales.62 It is striking how many of these loricati were retainers of the Church, roughly 70 per cent of them. Nineteen bishops and their loricati are mentioned in the source, more were already in Italy with the emperor, and one of them, Henry of Augsburg, is known to have perished in the battle with the Arabs.
The problems surrounding the emergence of episcopal retinues of minister iales in the eleventh century are not as yet capable of completely convincing solutions. 63 But it is clear that by the twelfth century, the armed retinues serving the German bishops consisted almost entirely of ministeriales sus tained by hereditary fi efs. 64 By fa r the most comprehensive picture of their status and fu nction is provided by the iura ministerialium drawn up by Arch bishop Rainald of Cologne fo r his retinue in the mid-u6os. 65 Apart fr om elaborate disciplinary rules and ordinances about the administration of the archiepiscopal household and estates, the custumal is most revealing about the military services which were the principal purpose of such retinues. Under their oaths of fe alty the ministeriales bound themselves, whether they held fiefs or not, 'to defend the terra of their lord the archbishop and to fo llow him in arms as far as the boundaries of the diocese', and in certain circum stances, beyond them. They were confi rmed in their hereditary right to their fiefs and offices by primogeniture, without payments of relief or heriot. Any younger brother was expected to present himself with war-horse, shield, and lance to the archbishop, to declare that he was miles et ministerialis of St Peter, the cathedral patron, and to offer fe alty and service. After a year's probation, the archbishop would fi nd him a fief and confirm his status as one of Col ogne's milites de fa milia, or else release him to seek service and reward in another retinue. The terms of service upon Italian expeditions were also set out in detail. Notice being given a year and a day in advance, ministeriales with fi efs worth 5 marks or more per annum were required to attend, the arch bishop awarding them 10 marks towards their fi tting-out costs, as well as cloth fo r dressing their servants. Equipment was specifi ed; pack-horses, saddles, leather hold-ails, coverings, and horseshoes with the necessary nails. On the march to the south, the archbishop paid each knight a mark a month once the Alps were reached. Those with fi efs worth less than the yearly 5 marks might stay behind, paying scutage or herstura, literally 'army-tax', of half their rental.
Such retinues of knightly ministeriales were essential to the survival, pres tige, and expansion of the German bishoprics as territorial principalities in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 66 The retinues accompanied the bishops upon their peregrinations around the Empire, to attend the imperial court or ecclesiastical synods, to visit monasteries, castles, and towns, or to join military campaigns. About the end of May II62, fo r example, Frederick Barbarossa wrote fr om Pavia to various princes of the Empire to summon them to meet him at Besan<;on in August, before he moved on to St Jean de Losne to meet Louis VII about settling the current papal schism. Bishop Conrad of Augs burg was advised that since it does no harm to take precautions, he ought to equip the milites attending him with weapons and armour. 'Moreover, you should bring tents, which are necessary because of the scarcity of lodging.'67 The ministeriales were also responsible fo r garrisoning episcopal castles and towns, and for prosecuting the necessary fe uds. By the end of the thirteenth century the iura or codes of service were beginning to be replaced by new registers of fi efs, and this indicates a decided shift not only in the status of ministeriales but also in the way in which episcopal retinues were struc tured. 6 8
The codes of service had sought essentially to discipline retinues of minis teriales through their servile legal status, particularly in licensing their mar riages so that the offspring, possessed of inherited fi efs, allods, castles, and offices, would not be dispersed to other lords. This might otherwise occur because the rights over ministeriales as servile persons, and a fo rtiori over their property, belonged in law to their mothers' lords. So it was essential that in the fr equent cases of marriage beyond the fa milia, the lords should come to agreement about a practical division of the offspring and the resources they stood to inherit. 69 But the registers of fi efs shift the mechanism of control on to the implied military obligations of ministeriales as vassals, and though this method was by no means neglected in the codes of service either, it prepon derates fr om about 1300.70 The rules of servile dependence might still be quite vigorously applied by the bishops at the beginning of the fourteenth century," 1 but the subdivision of fi efs and the progression of multiple vassa lage accumulating over the generations gave a decided preference to the regis- ters of fi efs, backed by Lehnrecht, as the more effective means of holding retinues together.72 This also indicates that rendering military services in return for fi efs was by no means a moribund practice in fo urteenth-century Germany. As we shall see, epis.::: opal treasuries were not up to paying fo r mili tary service on the basis of annual salaries or longer contracts, although it is clear that many of the fi efs were in fa ct assignments upon incomes fr om epis copal manors and other possessions.
To sustain an obedient and effective retinue in a competent state of military preparedness was, with the economic exploitation of their lands and the ad ministration of justice within their territory, the principal secular concern of bishops at home in their dioceses. The enfeoffment of knights was expensive, and the use or abuse of episcopal resources for the purpose often raised fe ars of waste in the cathedral chapters. 73 There were other dangers too. Minister iales were themselves a hereditary order of landowners with interests to defend, and this often led them into armed confl ict with their neighbours or even with their episcopal lords. 7 4 Multiple enfeoffment, mobility between retinues, and the subdivision of fi efs had also tended to erode the human com position of the retinue as well as the material fo undation of fiefs, castles, and offices upon which it was supposed to rest.
A closer examination of interaction between bishop and retinue is made possible for the Bavarian see of Eichsratt by the survival of two sources pro viding complementary information about its military circumstances in the later Middle Ages. The first consists of the series of biographies of the fo ur teen bishops who reigned between 1279 and 1445, its fi rst authors successfully establishing the tradition of taking particular note of military affairs. 7 5 Six of the biographies (13o6-ss) are the work of the Eichstatt canon Henry Taube of Selbach (d. 1364 ), a distinguished historian who wrote a general chronicle on the popes and emperors of his time. 7 6 All these biographies were continua tions of the Liber pontific a/is ordered by Bishop Gundechar II of Eichstatt in 107 1 or 1072. 77 The second source is the Eichstatt Liber feudorum, a paper codex of the early sixteenth century into which were copied eight registers of fiefs, the earliest of them dating fr om the fi rst decade of the fo urteenth cen-72 Spiess, HRG, ii, col. 168T 'Den aufstrebenden Territorialherrschaften, die, besonders seit der Zunahme der Pluralvasallitat und der damit einhergehenden verst3.rkten Mobilitiit der Lehnsmannen, auf aktuelle Bestandsaufnahme sowie auf Kontrolle und Erfassung der gesamten Vasallenschaft ausgerichtet waren, leisteten die Lehnregister bessere Dienste'; and col. 1688: 'Die Lehnregister stellen einen Versuch der Terr itorialherren dar, die persOnlichen Strukturen des Lehnswesens zu versachlichen, d. h. sie in eine tury. 78 The seven registers which fo llow are, in effect, lists of renewals of title upon the accession of the bishops fr om 1365 to 1496.79 If Eichstatt was not materially at the fo refront of the German bishoprics, it occupied a position of strategic significance in the borderlands of Franconia, Swabia, and Bavaria. 8 0 In the second half of the thirteenth century it recovered fr om great losses suf fe red at the hands of the cathedral advocates, the Bavarian comital dynasty of Hirschberg. Between 1280 and 1300 it became possible for the bishops to pur chase extensive lands, to establish a reformed administration on the basis of castles and offices enfeoffed to ministeriales, and to expand their military reti nue to about sixty knightly families. One result was attention to the written record: a new cartulary and cadastral survey, 81 the new register of fiefs, the construction of fo rmal episcopal memorials, and the better archival preserva tion of diplomatic originals, 82 all taking place within a few years of 1300.
Then, early in the fo urteenth century, the bishops' standing as territorial princes was greatly improved by a single inheritance. In 1305 the childless Count Gebhard of Hirschberg, last advocate of the cathedral church and town, made amends by bequeathing most of his extensive possessions to Eich statt. 83 The transfer included the majority of his knights and their fiefs, 84 and the 1365 register of fi efs indeed shows that the episcopal retinue had expanded by about so per cent over the fi gure about IJOO, fr om roughly sixty names to about ninety. This register appears not to be complete but, taken with the I 384 register, about three dozen of the knightly fa milies in the late fo urteenth-century Eichstatt retinue must have transferred their allegiance to the bishops fr om the Hirschberg retinue after 1305. But once again the epis copal treasury was often empty in the fo urteenth century; together with the lands, Eichstatt had inherited the massive Hirschberg debts and it also in curred new ones, all of which took decades to pay off. 8 5 The see probably suf fe red in the periodic economic crises of the fo urteenth and fifteenth centuries, 78 Bayerisches Staatsarchiv Niirnberg , Hochstift Eichstiitt Lehnbi.icher, I, fos. Ir-340v: Liber feu dorum ad collationem episcopi Ey stetensis spectantium fos. 1r-73v, before 1310; fos. 74r�85r (1365) 
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although definite answers about the agrarian milieu would have to await com parative study of the informative Eichstiitt land-register of about r300 and the rich fi fteenth-century cadastral evidence. 8 6 Bishops tended to be cautious about expanding their enfeoffed retinue of vassals, in spite of the several terri torial acquisitions which had transformed their political position in southern Germany. Such circumspection was abandoned upon the accession of Frederick of Oettingen in r383. His biographer describes his love of princely magnifi cence, and of his retinue repqrted that 'he had a large court of noblemen and a copious enough household, which he tenderly supported, maintained, and nourished.'87 His register of fiefs bears this out, recording more than zoo knightly names, well over a hundred of them apparently new vassals of the see. The counts of Oettingen were themselves powerful territori2l princes ad jacent to the bishopric on the west. Although Bishop Frederick was fond of the knightly fa milies who had served the Oettingen in the past, and granted at least fo rty of them Eichstiitt fi efs, his recruitment ranged far and wide amongst the nobility of Bavaria, Swabia, and Franconia.88 In part the bishop's motives fo r expanding the retinue arose fr om the perilous politics of southern Germany during the r38os, culminating in the defeat of the Swabian league of towns in r3 88. Although his predecessor had joined the anti-urban Herrenbund of princes at Nuremberg in r3 83, Frederick changed course and allied himself to the Swabian cities to fr ighten the dukes of Bavaria, who posed a constant threat to his see. 89 In this tactic he was fo llowed by Arch bishop Pilgrim of Salzburg, whose subsequent kidnap by the dukes actually precipitated the Swabian war. Although the league was defeated and his dio cese was ravaged, Bishop Frederick extricated himself without serious loss of standing. Obviously he was a contrary and single-minded prince. From r409 to r 4I 5 he still adhered to the Roman pontiff Gregory XII although nearly all Geburtstag (Munich, 1969), 87-152. 89 Deutsche Reichstagsakten, i. (Munich, 1867) , 363 f. (1383) Benjamin Arnold the rest of the Empire had abandoned him in fa vour of the Pisan candidates to the papal title. 9 0
Retaining knights on Bishop Frederick's generous scale was not continued after his death in 1415, although the fi ve bishops who reigned after him until the Reformation continued to cut a fi gure in south German politics. Numbers slowly declined fr om about 130 names at the accession of John of Heideck in 1415 to about eighty names in 1496, at the accession of Gabriel of Eyb. Ger man knights complained that bishops were keeping them out of fi efs as their services became less essential, but this was certainly not the reason fo r dwin dling numbers in the bishopric of Eichstatt. The bishops were, on the con trary, concerned to keep numbers up by fr esh recruitment, largely fr om the heirs of knightly fa milies which were extinguished without leaving direct male descendants. From the early fo urteenth century until 1496 the registers record nearly 400 fa mily names, but only about forty of them survive fr om the three fo urteenth-century registers right through to Bishop Gabriel's time. In sustaining a credible retinue the bishops were having to cope with several related problems: with mobility, that is, knightly fa milies transferring their allegiance elsewhere after one or two generations of service; with genetic fa ilure, that is, the demise of patrilineally-defined noble fa milies without leav ing direct descendants; with sales of fiefs, which had to be transferred with the bishops' consent and recorded by their chancery; and with rear-tenancies, that is, the sub-enfeoffment of fiefs or fr agments of fiefs to other parties, again requiring permission fr om the bishops. The registers record these various transfers of fiefs, the majority to collateral heirs who then received incomes, lands, offices, or castles fr om Eichstatt. 9 I
In terms of fa milies, the composition of the retinue over the decades was therefore very unstable indeed; about 400 names occurred over zoo years, but only ro per cent of them all the way through the registers. The remaining 90 per cent gravitated towards Eichstatt's service either in the fo llowing of an ambitious bishop such as Frederick of Oettingen, or as collateral heirs of epis copal knights, or by new enfeoffment. In most cases the provenance of the new names can be quite readily identified: fr om the disbanded retinue of the counts of Hirschberg, fr om the Landherren of ducal Bavaria, and fr om the Ritterschaft in neighbouring territories, that is, the Upper Palatinate, the county of Oettingen, and the dynastic lands of the Zollern burgraviate of Nuremberg. Contributions also came fr om the remnant of the imperial fa mi lia of ministeriales with their own knights, fr om the Ritterschaft fu rther afield in Swabia and along the River Main, and fr om a handful of towns, notably Nuremberg, Regensburg, and smaller communities in the dioceses of Augs burg, Eichstatt, and Wurzburg. The bishops thus cast a wide net of vassalage, the geographical and jurisdictional boundaries of territorial principalities as yet having little inhibiting effect upon the vassal-relationship which could be established and maintained between princes and a fa r-flung Ritterschaft. 92 The registers enable us to estimate with some precision the size of the epis copal retinue of knights in the fo urteenth and fifteenth centuries. But in spite of the traditions and training of the German nobility, we cannot assume that all of them rendered military service in return fo r their fiefs. The registers do not positively record obligations, although active military service in return fo r fiefs prevailed in many regions of Germany well into the sixteenth century. Some of the Eichstatt fi efs were actually portions of manorial revenue, especially tithes, drawn upon the estates of the cathedral church. Some con sisted of jurisdiction over Eichstatt's serfs in a given district. 93 Others were in effect episcopal property pledged to knights in return fo r cash. 94 The most important fi efs obviously did involve military command: the bishop's house hold offices, 9 5 and the captaincies of towns and castles. 9 6
More is revealed about military service in the episcopal biographies. The bishops are praised for the vigour with which they prosecuted their fe uds and fo r the care they devoted to their castles. Bishop Rabno of Wilburgstetten (1365-83) was noted to be in armis strenuus and we are told that 'he sup pressed the tyrannies of his many enemies, stoutly avenged the church of Eichstatt fo r the injuries inflicted upon it, and admirably supervised its defence. '97 Bishop Frederick of Oettingen 'rebuilt, embellished, and repaired all the castles with various buildings and structures' and there fo llows a long and detailed description of this work castle by castle throughout his territory. Another practical result of maintaining an efficient retinue was amply demon strated by this bishop in I4o8. His biographer tells us that this reverend prince also put down fr equent molestations by the Franconian nobility, with which they had audaciously and fearlessly persecuted him. Note that one day in the year of our Lord 1408 the Franconian nobility hostilely invaded the see of Eich statt with a large fo rce, and near Herrieden they savagely fe ll upon the peasantry with fire and pillage, carrying off their cattle and belongings. So our praiseworthy fa ther and lord fu riously pursued them with his magister curiae and others of his household.
In the evening the same day they bravely attacked them at the village of Lauterbach two miles fr om the town of Rothenburg in Franconia, boldly crushed them, seized back the peasants' goods, and took twenty-three of the enemy captive. Others of the enemy retreated into the castle in that village, or fled hither and thither. So they returned rejoicing to Herrieden with the captives, the peasants' belongings, and also the cattle. Of the noble and common captives the praiseworthy lord bishop afterwards allowed twenty-two of them to be decapitated after legal sentence. One of them, a young squire, just escaped death through the pleas made on his behalf. So the church of Eichstatt obtained tranquillity and peace, since the Franconian nobility did not again invade the diocese during the lifetime of that venerable bishop. He was hard on others of his adversaries, pursuing them courageously and permitting most of them to be sentenced to death or other punishments. 98 The Eichstatt biographers also reveal that the enfeoffed retinue was not the only source of military service employed by the bishops. When Frederick of Oettingen's successor John of Heideck (I4IS-29) joined the League of Con stance against Duke Louis the Bearded of Bavaria-Ingolstadt, 99 he main tained a private army of 300 salaried knights for the duration of the war (1420-2). His successor Albert of Hohenrechberg (I429-4S) sent fo rty or more knights to protect the towns near the Bohemian fr ontier fr om Hussite attack. In the Reichstag of I43I he was assessed at thirty lances fo r the Hus site crusade, Ioo and sent a larger contingent: ISO knights and ISO infantry with a train of thirty-two war-wagons 'beautifully made with ironwork and iron chains, capable of fo rming a fo rt and defence in necessity, and lavishly equipped with fo od, tools, tents, arms, cannon, powder, and crossbows'.
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It cost the bishop more than 3,000 fl orins, and all was lost in the field. By coinci dence an accurate illustration of an eight-wheeled battle-wagon carrying fo ur teen guns was included by Conrad Kyeser of Eichstatt in his military treatise Bellifortis, probably composed rather earlier than this campaign.
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Like his predecessors Bishop Albert was also involved in local conflicts, and for eight- een months maintained zoo knights to defend the diocese fr om the depreda tions of the counts of Oettingen. Like the Eichstatt series, registers of fiefs survive fo r the vassals of many another bishopric in late medieval Germany. IoJ In conjunction with related material, especially letters of enfeoffment and the Lehnsreverse, promissory acknowledgements binding the fe offees, I 04 we can perceive that vassalage was a military reality and had not entirely relapsed into an inanimate system of aristocratic land-tenure. If the fiefs recorded in the registers did not often carry a specific military obligation, then military service was still an enduring social tradition which in principle governed the relationship between knight and bishop, and was the motive fo r granting out, transferring, or renewing fiefs.
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The Eichstatt evidence reveals some remarkable continuities of method fr om the ninth to the sixteenth centuries in supporting the bishops' military retinues, fr om Bishop Erchanbald's use of the Herrieden lands after 888 to the preservation and editing of all the registers of fiefs into the paper codex in Bishop Gabriel of Eyb's chancery after rsoo. But we can see that the vassals who were sustained by a handsome proportion of the possessions of the cath edral churches were themselves no static order or group within German society. The humble milites of the Carolingian and Ottonian age were quite different fr om the ministeriales of the Staufen era, whose dynamism sustained them as a knightly nobility. In the fo urteenth century the bonds of servility which bound them closely into the fa miliae of their lords finally disappeared. They had evolved into the Ritterschaft as a privileged order or estate within the territorial principality. I 0 6 But their fu nction changed more slowly than defi nitions or appearances. The tradition of military service was not much affected by the decay of legal servility, and is likely to have been reinforced by the economic difficulties in which knighthood fo und itself in the fo urteenth and fi fteenth centuries. Knights were still fu lfilling much the same military and administrative fu nctions as in the thirteenth century, with the very same castles, offices, lands and revenues as reward.
Terms indicative of the servile nexus, ministerialis, Dienstleute, and homines proprii were in decline by the beginning of the fourteenth century, I 07 but vas salage still continued to vitalize the bond between retinues of knights and the territorial princes. In the Eichstatt registers the homines proprii of about r305 are called Lehenleute or vassals fr om r365 and are described as sesshaft, that is, in occupation of or in residence upon their fi efs. I 0 8 Rural Germany was not very well suited to newer methods of retaining which were evolved in France and England; the aliance, indenture, or fief-rente, although some fi efs in Ger many were indeed assignments upon income. I 0 9 These measures were more efficient in sustaining military mobility in long campaigns over great distances or across the sea itself. They were much less relevant to the German military situation in which the great majority of confl icts were local fe uds within terri torial or provincial dimensions. In addition, the German territorial principali ties were relatively backward in their administrative and fi scal organization and potential, so that although salaries certainly were paid to knights, the princes could not rely steadily upon their treasuries to maintain their retinues. They therefore depended upon traditional methods of direct enfeoffment with hereditary offices, fortifications, incomes, and estates which pertained to their principalities. Such methods were better suited to political reality in the German Empire, where private war conducted by the retinue was still an effective instrument.
This began to change again towards the end of the fifteenth century, when the princes were experimenting with legal and administrative innovations which enhanced their authority and their command of regional security and order.
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One consequence was that the ancient fu nctional connections 1 07 The first Eichstiitt register still has 'Homines infeudati ab Ecclesia qui proprii sunt Ecclesiae', fo s.
